An analytical report on the advisability of establishing relations between the US administration and conservative and patriotic strata of Russian society in the context of compliance with US national interests
Prepared by: HUMAN RIGHTS & ANALYTICAL HOUSE, INC. – March 1, 2025, United States,
Florida.

Introduction.
Following the decline in relations in 2014–2016 and the decline in popularity of pro-Western liberals within Russia, the question arose as to whether the United States should engage with Russian patriots, conservatives, and traditionalists to protect its national interests. The following analytical review compares approaches to interactions with different groups in Russia – “patriots” vs. liberals – before and after Donald Trump’s presidency, with an emphasis on the impact of Trump’s decisions (withdrawal from the WHO, criticism of vaccination, rejection of the Paris Climate Agreement, etc.) on the sentiments of the conservative part of Russian society. The analysis covers indicators of national security, economic and cultural influence of the United States, and includes comparative quantitative data in a table to illustrate key trends.

The popularity of liberals and conservatives in modern Russia
The lost popularity of liberals. Liberal democratic forces in Russia have lost ground significantly since the early 2000s. Sociological studies show that liberal ideology enjoys the support of a significantly smaller part of the population compared to conservative-patriotic views. For example, a VTsIOM poll (December 2020) showed that Russians put liberalism only in third place in terms of sympathies - after socialism and conservatism (We study the ideological preferences of Russians) (We study the ideological preferences of Russians). In particular, only about 10-15% of Russians prefer liberal values, while significantly more are inclined towards “traditional values” and patriotism (We study the ideological preferences of Russians) (We study the ideological preferences of Russians). This is confirmed by data from the Levada Center: in 2015, only 19% of Russians had a positive attitude towards the United States (Levada Center Records Improvement in Russians' Attitudes Toward the US, EU, and Ukraine — RBC) (partly associated with the liberal West), and the anti-rating of the US reached 64% (Levada Center Records Improvement in Russians' Attitudes Toward the US, EU, and Ukraine — RBC). This situation reflects the weak influence of pro-Western liberals and society’s wariness of “liberal” foreign ideas.
Dominance of patriotic-conservative sentiments. On the contrary, the ideas of patriotism and conservatism in post-Crimean Russia have become mass mainstream. Conservative ideology is close to a significant part of society: according to the same 2020 VTsIOM poll, conservatism is among the most attractive ideologies, almost on par with the socialist idea of ​​justice (We study the ideological preferences of Russians) (We study the ideological preferences of Russians). Patriotism as a value is especially popular: its support turned out to be “beyond competition” – the majority of Russians express sympathy for it (We study the ideological preferences of Russians). Almost 59% of Russians do not see much benefit in Western democracy and culture and tend to believe that “Western civilization… does not suit us” (VTsIOM. News: Western Influence and Russian Culture). Thus, the prevailing public mood is traditionalist, with a certain degree of skepticism towards liberal Western models. The authorities are using this: as the Russian Security Council notes, the West has been trying for decades to “erode traditional values” of Russia by investing “hundreds of millions of US dollars” in supporting opposition NGOs and media (Russian Security Council: Washington has sent hundreds of millions of dollars to the Russian opposition - Rossiyskaya Gazeta). These statements create an image of liberals as “alien agents of influence” and further reduce their popularity.

Trump and the "reset effect" for Russian patriots
Donald Trump’s rise to power in 2016 marked a turning point for Russian conservatives’ attitudes toward the United States. Russian society, especially its patriotic part, initially greeted Trump with cautious optimism. For the first time in a long time, the Kremlin and pro-regime circles began to hope for a dialogue with Washington without lectures on democracy. Below, we examine how perceptions of the United States among Russian patriots have changed during Trump’s presidency, and what impact key decisions by his administration have had on this.
Increased sympathies after the 2016 elections. Immediately after Trump's victory, polls recorded a significant improvement in the image of the United States in the eyes of Russians. According to the Levada Center, the share of Russians with a good attitude towards the United States increased from 19% in May 2016 to 28% in November 2016 – against the backdrop of Trump's victory (Levada Center: After Trump's Victory, Russians Have Begun to Treat the US Better — Realnoe Vremya). At the same time, the share of those with negative attitudes decreased: in 2016, 64% had a bad attitude towards the United States, and in 2017, it was already 52% (Levada Center Records Improvement in Russians' Attitudes Toward the US, EU, and Ukraine — RBC). In other words, anti-Americanism has weakened significantly – the level of negativity has fallen by ~12 percentage points in a year. Table 1 below summarizes the dynamics of public opinion “before and after Trump”:


Table 1. Change in Russians' attitudes toward the United States after Trump's election. The share of those with a positive attitude has grown, while the negative has decreased. (Source: Levada Center poll data (Levada Center Records Improvement in Russians' Attitudes Toward the US, EU, and Ukraine — RBC) (Levada Center Records Improvement in Russians' Attitudes Toward the US, EU, and Ukraine — RBC)).

As you can see, the “Trump effect” was real: almost ⅓ of the population (37%) began to have a positive attitude towards America in 2017 (Levada Center Records Improvement in Russians' Attitudes Toward the US, EU, and Ukraine — RBC), whereas in the last years of Obama's presidency there were only about 1/5 of them. At the same time, two-thirds of Russians (71%) at the end of 2016 spoke in favor of expanding ties with the West - a record level in 15 years (Levada Center Records Improvement in Russians' Attitudes Toward the US, EU, and Ukraine — RBC). This demonstrated the desire of even the patriotic part of society for dialogue if the US showed respect for Russian values. Experts noted that “Russians’ sympathy for Trump does not mean instant love for America; mistrust of the US is still great” (Levada Center: The Trump Effect). However, the very fact that the new US leader spoke positively about Moscow gave a chance to weaken the usually negative image of America (Levada Center: The Trump Effect). And the Russian “hawks” noticed this.

The Role of Trump's Decisions in the Eyes of Russian Conservatives. Trump's policies in a number of areas appealed to Russian traditionalists who shared similar skeptical views:

• Withdrawal from WHO and skepticism towards global institutions. Trump demonstratively distanced himself from international organizations (WHO, UNESCO, etc.), citing the protection of sovereignty. Russian conservatives, accustomed to suspecting global institutions of bias, took this with understanding. For example, when Trump announced the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization, similar calls were heard in the Russian State Duma to reconsider relations with the WHO and Russia (Russia has announced the consequences of the US withdrawal from WHO: Politics: World: Lenta.ru) (Russia has announced the consequences of the US withdrawal from WHO: Politics: World: Lenta.ru). Deputy Speaker Petr Tolstoy directly stated that Russia, too, “must leave the WHO,” since, according to him, the body has lost its impartiality. Such responses show that Trump’s steps resonated with the anti-globalist segment of the Russian establishment.

• Criticism of vaccination and pandemic management. Donald Trump has repeatedly questioned the scientific consensus, from climate change to vaccine safety. He has promoted anti-scientific ideas such as: “climate change does not exist, vaccines cause autism, coronavirus is just the flu” ("38% of all disinformation about the pandemic in the world": how Trump single-handedly fought science | Forbes Life). These statements were widely disseminated around the world. Russian anti-vaccinationists and conspiracy theorists welcomed them, seeing a like-minded person in the US leader. In 2020, about a third of all disinformation about the pandemic in the world came from Trump ("38% of all disinformation about the pandemic in the world": how Trump in ...), and in Russia this wave fueled local conspiracy theories. Conservative Russian media readily cited Trump’s skepticism about Western vaccines and the WHO. Although Moscow officially promoted its Sputnik V vaccine, informally anti-vaccination sentiments, supported by rhetoric from the US, increased mistrust of Western medical initiatives – which was in line with the line of Russian traditionalists defending the sovereign model of fighting COVID.

• Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement. Trump's decision to withdraw from climate agreements also found a response. The Russian leadership had an ambivalent attitude towards the Paris Agreement: although Russia eventually ratified it (in 2019), many in the elite are skeptical of the “climate agenda”, believing it to be holding back industrial development. Trump publicly called the Paris Agreement unfair and harmful to the US economy, which coincided with the opinion of some Russian industrialists and officials. President Putin, however, diplomatically called the US withdrawal from the agreement a “mistake” (Putin called the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement a mistake...), noting that the US could simply revise the quotas. However, a number of Russian commentators have stressed that Trump’s rejection of the “green agenda” is close to Russian interests in the oil and gas sector. The lack of pressure from Washington on the climate issue has temporarily eased the urgency of the issue for Moscow.

• Conservative values ​​and religion. Trump appealed to the religious conservative electorate in the US (evangelicals, etc.), spoke out against abortion, limited the promotion of LGBT rights – that is, he promoted what is close to Russian traditionalists. In Russia, state TV noted “Trump’s traditionalism” and his fight against the liberal establishment. For example, the fact that Trump is the first US president in a long time who has not openly promoted LGBT ideology abroad was a source of satisfaction for the Russian Orthodox Church and the conservative public. The coincidence in the rhetoric of family values ​​and religion strengthened sympathy: Trump was sometimes even compared to the Russian tsars in spirit, and the liberal opposition within the US – to opponents of “traditional America”. This brought together the value platforms of propagandists on both sides.

As a result of these factors, Trump's personal image was quite positive among many Russians. According to polls in early 2021, 25% of Russians had a positive attitude toward Donald Trump (in comparison, only 19% had a positive attitude toward Joe Biden).Russian-American Relations: Research by the Levada Center and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs — Russia in Global Affairs) (Russian-American Relations: Research by the Levada Center and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs — Russia in Global Affairs). The level of sympathy for Trump in the Russian Federation was comparable to his rating among Americans themselves (37% of Americans had a positive attitude towards him) (Russian-American Relations: Research by the Levada Center and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs — Russia in Global Affairs). This is an unprecedented case of convergence of opinions: usually the images of US leaders in Russia are extremely negative. It can be said that Trump has become the most “acceptable” US president for Russian patriots in recent decades. It is not for nothing that souvenirs with his image were distributed throughout the country – nesting dolls, T-shirts, commemorative coins. As sellers admitted, “souvenirs with the 45th US president are in demand” (Matryoshka Trump: How Russia Makes Money on the US President | Arguments and Facts) – a rare phenomenon for the image of the US leader in the Russian Federation. In fact, Trump entered Russian pop culture, his figure was perceived rather with sympathy, while previous US presidents were associated with aggression against Russia.
Thaw in public opinion. During the Trump presidency (2017–2020), the attitude of the Russian mass consciousness towards the United States remained significantly better than at the end of the Obama era. Although the initial inflated expectations have been somewhat corrected (the share of those believing in improved relations fell from 54% in November 2016 to 46% by the beginning of 2017 (Levada Center: Trump) (Levada Center: Trump)), the overall background was less hostile. In 2020, however, due to new sanctions and pre-election anti-Russian rhetoric in the United States, the mood worsened again - by the end of 2020, positivity fell to 35% (Levada Center: Russians' Attitudes Towards the US Have Improved). But with the departure of Trump and the arrival of Biden on a wave of hope, it grew again: at the beginning of 2021, 40% of Russians had a positive attitude towards the United States, against 43% with a negative one - almost parity (Levada Center: Russians' Attitudes Towards the US Have Improved). This is a significant improvement compared to ~20% of positive assessments in 2015. Thus, the “ephemeral Trump effect” still consisted of a softening of mass anti-Americanism. Even if nuclear patriots did not change their convictions, the degree of hostility decreased, and the space for dialogue expanded.

Comparison of Effectiveness: Interaction with Patriots vs. Liberals
Based on the above, we can analyze what the US gains from focusing on interaction with Russian patriots/conservatives compared to focusing on the liberal opposition, in terms of three key areas: security, economics, and cultural-ideological influence. Below is a comparative analysis, supported by both quantitative data and qualitative considerations.

1. National security and geopolitical interests
Interaction with liberals: The traditional US line of supporting democratic liberals and human rights activists in Russia has had rather negative side effects from a security perspective. Since liberals are marginalized within Russia, their support from outside is perceived by the Kremlin as hostile interference. Russian propaganda has for years claimed that Washington is funding a “fifth column” to undermine the state (Russian Security Council: Washington has sent hundreds of millions of dollars to the Russian opposition - Rossiyskaya Gazeta) (Russian Security Council: Washington has sent hundreds of millions of dollars to the Russian opposition - Rossiyskaya Gazeta). This serves as a justification for repression and the consolidation of patriotic forces against the “common enemy” – the United States. As a result, relying on liberals did not give the United States leverage over Moscow’s policies, but it strengthened anti-American sentiments among the authorities and security forces, which harmed security: Russia more harshly opposed US initiatives in Ukraine, Syria, etc., fearing a “color revolution” at home. In addition, the liberal opposition could not contribute to direct benefits for the United States in the security sphere – it does not have access to decision-making. For example, calls from liberal dissidents to withdraw Russian troops from anywhere had no weight. At critical moments (2014, 2018), the Kremlin only united even more with the patriotic majority against American pressure.

Engaging with Patriots: Getting closer to moderate patriotic circles – that is, the Russian leadership itself and loyal elites – can bring real security dividends. History shows that when the US and the Kremlin find common ground, important tasks can be accomplished. For example, after September 11, 2001, President Putin (who positions himself as a patriot) promptly supported the US in the war against the Taliban, providing valuable intelligence assistance in Afghanistan (Russia has broken with the unipolar system: incentives ...). This cooperation against a common terrorist enemy was in the national interests of the United States. On the contrary, in the 2010s, the confrontation deprived the parties of such interaction. Under Trump, elements of a pragmatic dialogue emerged: despite mutual suspicions, the military and diplomats of the two countries continued contacts on Syria (de-conflicting in the air, delineating zones of influence). Patriotic elites of the Russian Federation value strength and direct conversation without ideology - and the Trump administration has partly provided this. In particular, thanks to the personal communication channel between Trump and Putin in 2017-2019, it was possible to avoid direct clashes in Syria, where both powers were conducting operations. Also in 2020, Trump managed to involve Russia in a major OPEC+ deal (more details in the economic section) - which indirectly stabilized the situation, which is also important for security (preventing upheavals in oil-producing regions). In the area of ​​arms control, there was no breakthrough, but, for example, the agreement to extend the New START was actually agreed upon at the end of Trump's term and then implemented by Biden. Thus, by working with patriots in power, the US can achieve specific agreements that directly affect security (arms control, the fight against terrorism).

Reducing the risk of conflict. Dialogue with patriots can defuse the image of the enemy and reduce the likelihood of direct clashes. When Russian society and elites form an image of the United States not as an aggressor, but as a conditional partner (even if a competitor), the incentive for escalation decreases. Survey data confirm that during the warming period under Trump, only 16% of Russians saw the West as an adversary or enemy, while 80% preferred friendship and partnership (Levada Center: Russians' Attitudes Towards the US Have Improved). This is advantageous for the US, since a patriotically-minded Russia, which does not feel an existential threat from the US, is less inclined to risky military adventures. On the contrary, an isolated “fortress Russia” in a hostile West is a breeding ground for militarism. Consequently, from the standpoint of national security, direct work with patriots (Putin and his entourage) turned out to be more effective: it temporarily dulled the conflict (an example is the relative calm on the Ukrainian front in 2017-2019, compliance with the Minsk agreements, which was not the case in 2014-2015). Of course, this does not cancel out deep contradictions, but the strategy of “getting along with the real Russia” showed better results than attempts to rely on a liberal alternative within the Russian Federation.

2. Economic cooperation and influence
Relying on liberals: From an economic point of view, relying on Russian liberals is of little use to the US. The liberal opposition does not control resources and business, and their public support from the US often leads to the opposite effect - economic sanctions and a breakdown in ties. Thus, after the US imposed sanctions on the Kremlin's cronies for suppressing the opposition, Moscow responded by strengthening its course towards self-isolation and an eastern turn. As a result, US-Russia trade turnover did not grow, but decreased: according to the US Census Bureau, US exports to Russia fell after 2014 and by 2020 amounted to only ~$4.9 billion (-15% compared to 2019) ([PDF] US Trade with Russia - Bureau of Industry and Security). Support for liberal NGOs led to many of them being closed as “undesirable,” and American investment and humanitarian programs in the Russian Federation were curtailed. From the point of view of economic penetration into the Russian market, relying on liberals turned out to be a dead end, as it caused sharp opposition from the authorities. It became more difficult for American companies to work: increased political risks, negative attitude of the Russian authorities towards companies from the “unfriendly country.” As a result, the US share in Russia’s foreign trade stagnated at ~5th-6th place (Trade and economic relations). Cultural-liberal influence (for example, through Hollywood, IT services) also began to be limited – let’s remember the law on “foreign agents” for IT companies and the media.

Relying on Patriots: Pragmatic engagement with patriotic Russia, on the other hand, has opened up some economic windows of opportunity. Under Trump, who has personally focused on business deals, there have been several notable moves. First, in 2017–2018, major energy projects involving the US and Russia were discussed (though not fully implemented) – for example, ExxonMobil’s investments in Arctic fields were again a topic of negotiations. Trump even considered lifting sanctions on Russia in exchange for concessions on nuclear weapons, which could open the way for business (Thirty Years of Going in Circles: US Policy Towards ...). Second, when the oil price collapse of 2020 hit, Trump personally called Putin and the Saudi king and facilitated the “historic deal” of OPEC+. In April 2020, Russia and Saudi Arabia agreed to cut oil production, stabilizing prices (Trump thanks Putin and Saudis for 'great deal') (Trump to join Russia-Saudi talks...). Trump publicly thanked Putin for this “wonderful deal,” noting that it would save jobs in the US oil industry (Trump thanks Putin and Saudis for 'great deal'). This is a clear example of winning economic cooperation: the patriotic elite of the Russian Federation received higher oil prices, and the United States received support for its energy sector. The liberal opposition could not have given the United States such advantages in principle. Thirdly, interaction with the Russian Federation under Trump did not prevent American exports to Russia from holding up - before the 2019 pandemic, exports even increased slightly (to ~$5.8 billion) ([PDF] US Trade with Russia - Bureau of Industry and Security). And although geopolitics constrained closer ties, informal Washington-Moscow dialogue maintained basic economic relations (for example, deliveries of Russian titanium parts to Boeing, etc., continued without interruption).

Sanctions and counter-sanctions. With a focus on cooperation with patriots, there is a chance to soften the sanctions confrontation. Russian authorities have made it clear that they are ready for deals: “lift the restrictions – and we will find an acceptable format for cooperation,” RANEPA experts said in an interview with RBC (Population of the United States - Wikipedia). That is, economic pragmatism could prevail over ideology. In 2019-2020, the United States practically did not introduce new tough sanctions (until the Navalny case in 2021) - and this helped businesses on both sides. Thus, the US-Russian trade turnover in 2020 even increased in certain categories (for example, Russia increased the export of fertilizers and metals to the US, and the US - the export of agricultural products). The cultural and economic influence of the United States through consumer goods, technology, social networks also remained significant - the younger generation of Russians continued to use Instagram, YouTube, iPhones. And although this influence is not directly related to the "patriots", the general background of relations under Trump made it possible not to fragment these ties. In comparison, during the aggravation of 2022 (already without dialogue), many American companies left the Russian Federation, which greatly reduced the economic presence of the United States. Therefore, it is in the interests of the US economy to have a minimally stable relationship with the real (patriotic) Russia, rather than moral support for unpopular liberals, which only leads to an escalation of sanctions and loss of markets.

3. Cultural and ideological influence and “soft power”
Through liberals (value export): Since the Cold War, the United States has tried to influence the minds of Russians by promoting liberal democratic values ​​- human rights, freedom of speech, individualism. In the 1990s, this had some effect, but by the 2020s, it had caused rejection among the majority of the population. As the 2022 VTsIOM poll showed, only 9% of Russians consider the influence of Western culture to be positive, while 44% are convinced of its negative influence (VTsIOM. News: Western Influence and Russian Culture) (VTsIOM. News: Western Influence and Russian Culture). Only young people are somewhat more open (up to 23% of young people see advantages) (VTsIOM. News: Western Influence and Russian Culture), but the older generations – the base of patriots – are sharply opposed. US attempts to rely on liberal values ​​(LGBT rights, “export of democracy”) have actually alienated Russian society. The Kremlin has successfully reinforced the opinion that Western culture is destroying traditions and “spirituality”. As a result, the direct cultural influence of the US through pro-Western intellectuals is minimal – independent media and cultural projects have been declared “foreign agents” and marginalized. It can be said that the “soft power” of the US through the liberal stratum has failed – the audience of liberal media in the Russian Federation is a few percent of the population.
Through conservative-patriotic dialogue: Paradoxically, reaching out to patriotic segments of society opens up another avenue of cultural influence – through the search for common values. Political differences aside, American and Russian conservatives have common ground: faith in family, religion, national sovereignty, and a rejection of radical progressivism. This was partially evident during Trump’s presidency, with figures like Stephen Bannon and right-wing media in the US flirting with the ideas of the Russian philosopher Dugin (The US Right-Wing Media Embrace Russia's Far-Right Ideologue), while in Russia, right-wing conservative circles admired Trump’s “traditional America” (Black PR American Style: Russians Like Trump - Pravda.Ru). Such contacts remain niche, but they blur the image of the US as a monolithically liberal enemy country. When Russian TV showed that the US also had patriots who were unhappy with the globalists, part of the audience began to treat American culture differently. For example, the well-known Orthodox oligarch Malofeev praised conservative shifts in America and even held forums with the participation of Western right-wingers. This creates cultural bridges: American conservative culture (cowboys, Christian motifs, anti-SJW rhetoric) became somewhat sympathetic to some layers in the Russian Federation.
In addition, American mass culture – cinema, music, sports – remains popular among Russians, including patriots, if it does not contradict their values. When the political background improves (as it did under Trump), the Russian authorities do less to hinder this influence. For example, in 2018, Hollywood blockbusters were shown in Moscow without exceptions, athletes and rock musicians from the United States came to competitions and tours. This tacit penetration of the American way of life has a much stronger impact on ordinary Russians than Khodorkovsky's lectures on democracy. By working with patriots, the United States indirectly keeps soft power channels open – exchanges, tourism (in pre-pandemic 2019, ~300 thousand Russian tourists visited the United States), educational programs for students, etc. When relations become more tense, many of these channels are cut off. For example, in 2021–2022, the number of Russians studying in the US dropped sharply, and tourism almost stopped – cultural ties weakened to a minimum. The lesson here is: pragmatic cooperation with the real Russian government creates a background against which American culture can peacefully coexist and attract sympathy, especially among young people. In the long term, this increases the chances of an evolution of views in a more pro-American direction than a frontal bet on unpopular liberals who cause immediate rejection.

Conclusion
Conclusions. The conducted research shows that in the current conditions, the expediency of reorienting the United States towards interaction with Russian patriots/conservatives is significantly higher than continuing to rely on openly pro-Western liberals who have lost support within Russia. Donald Trump's presidency has become an experiment that has demonstrated the potential of such an approach:

• Russian public opinion has softened significantly with a more respectful, non-ideological attitude from Washington. The share of positively-minded Russians has grown from ~20% to 40% (Levada Center Records Improvement in Russians' Attitudes Toward the US, EU, and Ukraine — RBC) (Levada Center: Russians' Attitudes Towards the US Have Improved), and 71% of citizens in 2016 wanted friendship with the West (Levada Center Records Improvement in Russians' Attitudes Toward the US, EU, and Ukraine — RBC) is a figure close to the highs of the warming era. Although this effect has partially faded after 2021, the fact that it appeared is important.

• Trump's decisions, which are in tune with the values ​​of the Russian right-wing public (skepticism about the WHO, climate, globalization), have improved the image of the United States among conservatives. Trump became the first US leader whom Russian patriots perceived not as an enemy, but as a possible partner who shared some of their views (Levada Center: The Trump Effect). This opened the door to dialogue on security and economic issues, which had previously been blocked.

• From the point of view of US national security: a direct channel with the patriotic elites of the Russian Federation allowed to achieve practical results (anti-terrorism, strategic stability), or at least prevent the worst scenarios. Support of marginal liberals did nothing in terms of containing Russia, but rather aggravated the confrontation.

• In economics and influence: interaction with patriots promotes stable trade relations and mutual benefits (example - the 2020 oil deal is beneficial for both sides (Trump thanks Putin and Saudis for 'great deal')). Attempts to put pressure through liberals led to sanctions and mutual losses, reducing the US economic presence in the Russian Federation. The US cultural influence is better consolidated through “people’s diplomacy” and mass culture, which is hindered by political tension. The reduction of tensions under Trump allowed American soft power to act more freely (films, the Internet, fashion), quietly strengthening the US position in the minds of young Russians.

Ultimately, a comparative analysis before and after Trump clearly demonstrates that the strategy of interacting with Russia “as it is” – through establishing working relations with the patriotic-conservative government and society – has proven more effective for US national interests than relying on the Kremlin’s unpopular domestic opponents. This does not mean abandoning support for human rights, but it does imply a more subtle balance between values ​​and interests. As Denis Volkov (Levada Center) noted, the Russian government can draw legitimacy not only from confrontation with America, but also from interaction with it (Levada Center: The Trump Effect). Therefore, if the US finds a format of interaction in which Russian patriots will feel respect for their interests, then Moscow will receive an incentive for cooperation, not confrontation.

Recommendations
Given the above, it is in the interests of the United States to reconsider the emphasis of its policy towards the Russian Federation. In the short term, it is worth establishing channels of communication with conservative circles (dialogue between experts, patriotic opposition, public figures, bloggers, religious leaders). Particular attention should be paid to interaction with opponents of vaccination, since these circles have largely lost trust in Putin, but sympathize with Donald Trump. In the concept of interaction with Russian patriotic circles, it is important to show respect for Russian history and culture - without directly imposing a liberal order. This can reduce the level of hostility and create a basis for pragmatic deals that are beneficial to the United States. In the long term, this approach does not exclude positive changes within Russia - on the contrary, through the gentle involvement of the majority (and not confrontation with it), the United States can indirectly contribute to the evolution of views and openness of Russian society.

Success depends on the US work in the Russian direction depends on many factors (including Russia's own readiness for dialogue). However, the lesson of the "Trump era" is the need for a realistic approach. A stake on patriotic dialogue has proven to be more effective and less risky than confrontation for the sake of abstract ideals. For US national security, the economy and global influence, it is more advantageous to have a difficult but partner in the person of patriotic Russia than an irreconcilable enemy united against "American interference". Following this conclusion, Washington can develop a new strategy towards the Russian Federation, combining interaction with Russian patriots and strength and pragmatism - and thereby better protect US national interests in a dynamically changing geopolitical reality.


Report prepared by:
HUMAN RIGHTS & ANALYTICAL HOUSE, INC.
United States,
Florida. March 1, 2025