Research

Problems with the Selective Approach of Human Rights Organizations in Protecting the Rights and Freedoms of Advocates of Conservative Values ​​and problems of equal access of different groups of society to human rights protection.

Announcement

Research on the Selective Approach of Human Rights Organizations in Protecting the Rights of Advocates of Liberal and Conservative Values. The research examines cases from various regions worldwide, including the United States, EU countries, Europe, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and the CIS.

HUMAN RIGHTS & ANALYTICAL HOUSE sought to identify the most significant instances of discrimination in the selection of human rights subjects for advocacy. The research also highlights human rights organizations that exhibit a biased or selective approach, assessing the scale, consequences, and associated threats to democracy, human rights and freedoms, and the maintenance of the most impartial legal systems. At the conclusion of the research, HUMAN RIGHTS & ANALYTICAL HOUSE analyzes measures that could help eliminate discrimination in the protection of the rights of individuals with conservative values and ensure equal access for all societal groups to the most comprehensive and fair human rights protection. This research is unique in highlighting the insufficient attention democratic institutions have given to this issue.

HUMAN RIGHTS & ANALYTICAL HOUSE will strive to apply the findings of this research in its human rights advocacy practice to prevent discrimination in the protection of the rights of those upholding traditional and conservative values. This research has identified such discrimination as a global, systemic issue that poses a serious challenge to democracy, justice, and the development of a just and law-based society.

Introduction

The principle of the universality of human rights, as well as the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, require equal protection of the rights and freedoms of all people, regardless of their ideological views. However, since the early 1990s, there have been many discussions about the selectivity of the approach of human rights movements - the tendency to protect predominantly the advocates of liberal democratic values ​​​​than representatives of conservative ideology. Such accusations of partisan bias have been repeatedly made both in Western democracies and in post-Soviet states. For example, the review article notes that human rights are often perceived as a "liberal political movements", and human rights activists themselves are associated in public opinion mainly with the liberal political camp (). Critics point to instances where human rights defenders have exhibited selection bias – that is, they have selectively focused on the rights violations of some groups and ignored similar oppression of others (). This research, conducted by HUMAN RIGHTS & ANALYTICAL HOUSE, presents an academic analysis of this problem of bias, with examples from 1991 to the present day from the United States, the EU and Europe as a whole, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and other CIS countries. Specific cases are considered, when democratic forces were actively protected by human rights organizations, while holders of conservative views faced discrimination and neglected and denied equal protection. The research provides examples of organizations that clearly demonstrated such an approach (based on established facts), conducts a comparative analysis and draws a conclusion about the inadmissibility of discrimination on ideological grounds in global human rights activities, as well as possible ways to overcome this problem, which poses a significant threat to democracy and equal access to the protection of universally recognized human rights and freedoms.

Selective approach of human rights defenders: regional examples

United States of America (USA)

In the United States, the question of the possible partisan bias of human rights organizations is primarily expressed through the activities of such organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Historically, the ACLU has defended the rights and freedoms of representatives of a wide range of views - a classic example is its defense of freedom of speech even for far-right groups (up to the neo-Nazi march in Skokie in 1977). However, in recent decades, observers have noted a shift in the balance: the ACLU is increasingly associated with a liberal agenda and less actively supports conservatives in controversial situations. In 2022, Politico reported that a number of former ACLU leaders, frustrated by the organization’s “drift” from traditional neutrality, had created a new entity, FIRE, to unconditionally defend free speech—effectively to fill the niche that the ACLU was gradually ceding. According to former ACLU executive director Ira Glasser, the union has recently "shifted away from its traditional role" as an impartial defender of the First Amendment, especially when it comes to unpopular or conservative speech ().

A concrete example is the situation with religious conservatives and their right to freedom of conscience. When it comes to, for example, the rights of Christians to express traditional views, the ACLU and similar organizations often take the side of liberal values. For example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado (2018), a conflict between the right of a religious cake maker to refuse to serve a same-sex wedding and anti-discrimination standards, many human rights activists supported the restrictions imposed by the LGBT couple, rather than the cake maker’s constitutional arguments. At the same time, the ACLU actively defended the rights of liberal protest movements (for example, anti-racist actions, marches for reproductive rights, etc.), promptly responding to cases of police abuse. This asymmetry has given rise to the opinion among some conservatives that human rights in the United States have become a “leftist agenda,” which is harmful to the human rights movement itself. As researchers note, if human rights are perceived as values ​​of only one segment of society, their moral weight and influence inevitably decline.

Europe and EU countries

In European democracies, similar trends can be seen in the activities of international and national human rights groups. Many European human rights NGOs are vocal about violations of the rights of people with liberal views (for example, the persecution of investigative journalists, LGBT activists, or opposition protesters), but are less willing to stand up for those with conservative or, especially, far-right views.

A striking example is the reaction of the human rights community to the case of British activist Tommy Robinson. Robinson, known for his far-right, anti-immigration views, was arrested and sentenced to prison in 2018 on charges of contempt of court (for broadcasting video outside the court during a gang violence trial) (Amnesty International cares about the Forgotten Prisoner? Forget about it. – Arthur Braun) (Amnesty International cares about the Forgotten Prisoner? Forget about it. – Arthur Braun). His supporters claimed that the case was politically motivated and that Robinson was a prisoner of conscience for drawing attention to a sensitive issue. However, major human rights organizations such as Amnesty International failed to respond to the incident. Amnesty did not issue an Urgent Action in his defense and directly told those who asked that it could not help in the case, suggesting only that they “contact a lawyer in the UK” (Amnesty International cares about the Forgotten Prisoner? Forget about it. – Arthur Braun). By comparison, the same Amnesty has actively campaigned in support of opposition bloggers in authoritarian countries – for example, the Azerbaijani activist Jabbar Savalanli, who was arrested on trumped-up charges for calling for a “Day of Wrath” against the regime (Amnesty International cares about the Forgotten Prisoner? Forget about it. – Arthur Braun). The organization immediately demanded Savalanli’s release, calling him a prisoner of conscience. The comparison of these cases – Robinson in democratic Great Britain vs. Savalanli in authoritarian Azerbaijan – illustrates the obvious discrimination and imbalance: the rights of a radical conservative in Europe were left without the support of international human rights defenders, while the rights of a liberal oppositionist in the post-Soviet space were vigorously defended.

Similar discrimination is observed against Russian conservatives, traditionalists, or right-wing and far-right ideologists, where international human rights organizations actively defended the opposition feminist group Pussy Riot and opposition politician Alexei Navalny, but did not take the initiative to defend right-wing opposition politicians Vladimir Kvachkov and Igor Strelkov (Girkin), who were also persecuted by the Kremlin for political reasons.

Similar selectivity has been observed in other EU countries. In Finland, the case of MP Päivi Räsänen, who was brought to trial for publicly quoting biblical texts about the sinfulness of homosexual relations, was widely discussed in 2019–2020. Despite the fact that the issue was about freedom of religion and expression, international human rights organizations hardly intervened, leaving Räsänen’s defense to national conservative associations and Christian human rights groups. At the same time, European NGOs vigorously condemned violations of the rights of the LGBT community in Poland and Hungary, where conservative governments imposed restrictions – actions that were immediately classified as human rights violations.

Accusations of double standards have also been noted within the European Union and the Council of Europe. For example, the leadership of Poland and Hungary (representing a national-conservative course) has repeatedly accused Western European institutions and NGOs of bias: in their opinion, liberal organizations are more tolerant of violations committed by left-wing or liberal governments, and, conversely, judge conservative regimes more harshly. Although human rights activists reject these accusations, insisting that they apply uniform standards, the perception of “protecting one’s own” is still clearly present. For example, the founder of Human Rights Watch, Robert Bernstein, criticized his organization for paying disproportionately more attention to accusations against democratic Israel than against authoritarian Arab regimes in the region (Criticism of Human Rights Watch - Wikipedia). He noted that from 2006 to 2009, HRW issued 87 statements condemning Israel, while it criticized violations by Palestinian groups and Lebanese Hezbollah only ~12 times in total (Criticism of Human Rights Watch - Wikipedia). Bernstein called this imbalance evidence of a shift in the focus of the organization and “a discarding of the distinction between open and closed societies” (Criticism of Human Rights Watch - Wikipedia). HRW's leadership has categorically rejected accusations of bias, saying any reputable human rights organization is obliged to apply the same standards to all countries without exception (Criticism of Human Rights Watch - Wikipedia). Nevertheless, this dispute is indicative: it demonstrates that even within a single structure there can be debates about whether certain ideological priorities dominate the agenda.

Russia and post-Soviet states (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, CIS)

In the post-Soviet space, the problem looks somewhat different, but elements of selectivity are also evident here. After 1991, authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes were established in Russia, Belarus and a number of other CIS countries, and the human rights community – both international and local – focused its efforts on protecting democratic forces, that is, the liberal opposition, independent journalists, and human rights defenders. For example, in Belarus, since the mid-1990s, human rights organizations (the Vesna Center, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, etc.) have consistently spoken out in defense of detained participants in pro-democracy protests who were subjected to repression by Lukashenko. In Russia, in the 2000s–2010s, international NGOs loudly spoke out about the fate of prisoners of conscience – from scientist Igor Sutyagin and businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky to members of the punk group Pussy Riot. Amnesty International directly called the latter “prisoners of conscience,” emphasizing that they are being persecuted for expressing criticism of the authorities (Pussy Riot Members Slam Amnesty That Freed Them). Similarly, the arrests of liberal opposition leaders (Boris Nemtsov, Alexei Navalny, etc.) have always been accompanied by solidarity campaigns and demands for their release.

However, in cases where conservative or nationalist viewpoints have faced repressive measures from the authorities, the reaction of human rights activists has been either restrained or absent. A case in point is the political persecution of Vladimir Kvachkov, who was held in custody for a long time in the same cell as Khodorkovsky, but unlike Khodorkovsky was effectively deprived of attention and human rights assistance from international human rights organizations. This can be explained by several factors. Firstly, authoritarian post-Soviet regimes themselves positioned themselves as guardians of “traditional values,” and repressions in the eyes of the international community were associated with liberals, not with conservatives loyal to the Kremlin ideology. Therefore, numerous cases of persecution of right-wing conservative opponents of the Russian government remained without due attention. Secondly, among radical nationalists who were often subjected to political persecution (for example, some figures of the Russian far right in the Russian Federation in the 2000s), there were often calls for violence or extremist rhetoric, which put such figures outside the subjective concept of a "prisoner of conscience" accepted among liberals. Human rights organizations openly stated that they do not intend to protect those who themselves violate the rights of others through hate speech or violence. Thus, Amnesty International in 2021 initially refused to consider Alexei Navalny a prisoner of conscience after learning about his previous nationalist statements (in the 2000s), since Amnesty's internal policy excludes assigning this status to people who called for hatred (Fact Check: Post on Amnesty decision about Alexei Navalny misses key context | Reuters). Later, however, the organization reversed its decision and apologized, noting that the cancellation of the status was a mistake and that the evolution of Navalny's views now makes him an uncompromising fighter for rights and freedoms (Fact Check: Post on Amnesty decision about Alexei Navalny misses key context | Reuters). This episode clearly demonstrated ideological bias: human rights activists declare their loyalty to universal principles, but they willingly defend liberals and refuse to defend conservatives. One way or another, the “liberal bias” of the human rights community (for example, rejection of xenophobia, sympathy for LGBT) influences the preference for human rights protection of some and discrimination against others.

Another example is Ukraine after 2014. The international human rights community strongly condemned the human rights abuses of the previous pro-Russian regime (for example, the beating of protesters on the Maidan in 2013–2014) and supported the new democratic institutions. At the same time, in the following years, some pro-Russian or ultra-conservative Ukrainians reported harassment, whether in the form of bans on pro-Russian parties, prosecutions for separatist statements, or censorship of Soviet symbols. The response of major human rights NGOs to such episodes was either lukewarm or absent. For example, the ban on the Communist Party of Ukraine and a number of pro-Russian organizations in 2014–2015 raised concerns only among individual human rights experts, but did not lead to large-scale campaigns by Amnesty or HRW, in part because these measures were justified by national security concerns in the context of the war. On the other hand, when right-wing radical groups in Ukraine attacked vulnerable minorities (Roma settlements, LGBT events), human rights activists actively intervened and demanded that the authorities stop them (Criticism of Amnesty International - Wikipedia). This difference in approaches suggests that the protection of the rights of conservatives (in this case, radical nationalists or groups nostalgic for the USSR) is not a priority or is even taboo, while the protection of victims of far-right violence is fully consistent with the liberal human rights agenda and ensures broad human rights support.

Finally, in a number of Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), the situation demonstrates another dimension of the problem. Here, conservative religious groups (for example, followers of non-traditional Islamic movements) were often persecuted by secular but authoritarian regimes. International human rights organizations, committed to the principle of protecting any peaceful faiths, stood up for them. In Uzbekistan in the 2000s–2010s, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch regularly called for the release of thousands of Muslim believers convicted for political reasons (for belonging to Islamist parties or distributing religious literature) – despite the fact that the views of these prisoners were far from secular-liberal, and in some cases bordered on terrorist ideologies. This fact emphasizes that human rights activists not only unequivocally ignore conservatives, but in the matter of choice are guided by the political situation. However, such cases also received far less public attention than, for example, the fate of secular dissidents, and so the general imbalance and accusations of bias remained.

Comparative analysis and statistics of imbalance

The examples provided point to a certain imbalance in the approach of human rights organizations to the protection of different groups. In quantitative terms, this imbalance is not always easy to measure, since human rights activities are not limited to simply counting cases. However, individual statistical evidence and comparative data give an idea of ​​the scale of the phenomenon:

• Focus on liberal activists: According to an internal review of Human Rights Watch's activities in the late 2000s, the organization focused disproportionately on criticizing democracies, and especially Israel, compared to authoritarian regimes (Criticism of Human Rights Watch - Wikipedia). Of the 100% of mentions of the Middle East region, ~15% were about Israel, which, as N. Sharansky noted, turned HRW into “an instrument in the hands of dictatorial regimes to fight democracies” (Criticism of Human Rights Watch - Wikipedia). Although HRW has rejected this assessment, declaring its commitment to uniform standards, the very fact that such a discussion is taking place points to a sense of imbalance.
• Lack of support for conservatives. Case studies show that conservative figures rarely make it into Urgent Action campaigns or prisoner of conscience lists. For example, not a single representative of the European far-right imprisoned for non-violent speech has been included in Amnesty's Prisoners of Conscience list in recent decades, while hundreds of left-liberal activists around the world have been awarded this status. In the already mentioned Tommy Robinson case, Amnesty's lack of response contrasts with the organization's numerous letters and petitions in support of opposition figures from the CIS and the Middle East (Amnesty International cares about the Forgotten Prisoner? Forget about it. – Arthur Braun) (Amnesty International cares about the Forgotten Prisoner? Forget about it. – Arthur Braun). Similarly, in the US, much of the ACLU's free speech legal resources in the 2010s were directed toward liberal or neutral figures (such as defending Occupy Wall Street or Black Lives Matter protesters), while far-right speakers were often left without their direct assistance – something that even members of the organisation itself have noted (Free-speech group will spend millions to promote First Amendment cases - POLITICO).
• Ideological fault lines within the organizations themselves. The statistics also indirectly manifest themselves in personnel decisions. For example, after Amnesty International adopted a policy in 2007 supporting the decriminalization of abortion, dozens of conservative members left its ranks, and the Catholic Church broke off cooperation (Criticism of Amnesty International - Wikipedia). This suggests that the value shift (in this case, to the left, toward a progressive agenda) was noticeable within the organization and led to measurable consequences (a reduction in membership and funding from traditionalists). At the ACLU, a similar process—the outflow of classic libertarians and the arrival of social justice activists—has changed the proportion of cases, according to qualitative assessments: if earlier a significant portion of lawsuits concerned the neutral protection of civil liberties regardless of views, then by the 2020s priorities had shifted toward combating discrimination against minorities and expanding liberal values ​​(Free-speech group will spend millions to promote First Amendment cases - POLITICO) (Free-speech group will spend millions to promote First Amendment cases - POLITICO).
• Public perception. Public opinion polls show different levels of trust in human rights defenders among liberals and conservatives. In the United States, Republicans are significantly less trusting of international human rights NGOs, often viewing them as “politically biased.” While exact figures vary, qualitative research suggests that perceptions of bias do influence support for human rights among conservatives (Conservatives, Liberals, and Human Rights | Hoover Institution Conservatives, Liberals, and Human Rights). This state of affairs can be seen as a direct “statistical” effect of the human rights imbalance: one-sided protection has led to a loss of trust among almost half of the political spectrum.

In general, it can be said that the imbalance is manifested not only in individual examples, but also in the general profile of the activities of human rights organizations. Liberal democratic activists are more often given the status of victims of human rights violations, their names are mentioned in reports and campaigns, while conservative or religious-traditionalist figures are either less often in the spotlight or are deliberately excluded from it (if their rhetoric contradicts the worldview of human rights groups). Of course, human rights activists justify this approach by fidelity to universal principles (inadmissibility of hate speech, violence, etc.). Nevertheless, the actual imbalance in total creates an image of politically selective activity, which is confirmed both by examples from practice and by the responses of the participants of the human rights movement themselves.

• Amnesty International. As one of the largest global NGOs, Amnesty has repeatedly faced accusations of ideological selectivity. It has been accused of pro-Western and liberal bias (for example, from China and Russia) (Criticism of Amnesty International - Wikipedia), and also that Amnesty does not pay enough attention to the problems of groups that are inconvenient to the liberal agenda (the case of silence in the T. Robinson case, the withdrawal of the Catholic Church from the list of partners (Criticism of Amnesty International - Wikipedia) and others). At the same time, Amnesty itself strives to demonstrate impartiality - in 2022, it released a report condemning the "double standards" of Western governments in their response to the war in Ukraine, calling for an equally acute response to all humanitarian crises ("Double Standards of the West"? This Is Not About Violating the Rights of Russians). The move is intended to bolster the organization's image as acting outside of politics, although internal controversy (such as the Navalny case) shows that there are disputes about the boundaries of what is acceptable.
• Human Rights Watch (HRW): A second major international group, HRW, has also been the target of criticism for its perceived politicization, the main precedent being the public dispute between HRW founder Robert Bernstein and the current leadership over the disparity in the assessment of democracies and dictatorships (due to the focus on Israel) (Criticism of Human Rights Watch - Wikipedia). In addition, in recent years, HRW has been accused of being too soft on radical Islamist movements while being tough on the actions of some Western countries, which conservatives have viewed as ideological bias. In response, HRW has officially stated that it adheres to uniform criteria and does not differentiate victims by political views (Criticism of Human Rights Watch - Wikipedia). Moreover, the principle of non-discrimination against any group is declared as fundamental to their work. However, the facts revealed indicate the opposite: in 2023, a number of employees criticized HRW's response to the military conflict in the Middle East as "violating the responsibility to stand up for the rights of all", regardless of the side in the conflict (Criticism of Human Rights Watch - Wikipedia). This indicates that this problem exists within HRW, although there is an understanding of the problem and attempts to address and correct it.
• American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Although the ACLU operates primarily in the United States and focuses on constitutional rights, its evolution is indicative of global trends. The ACLU has traditionally prided itself on its ideological neutrality, defending the freedoms of both the far right and the far left, “the speech we hate,” as its founders put it. But in the 21st century, the organization has become increasingly involved in partisan political campaigns, advancing the progressive movement’s agenda (Free-speech group will spend millions to promote First Amendment cases - POLITICO). This was reflected, for example, in the ACLU’s reconsideration of its approach to protecting the right of militant far-right groups to rally after the Charlottesville riots (2017). By 2020, former ACLU leaders openly stated that the Union was “losing steam” in its neutral defense of free speech (Free-speech group will spend millions to promote First Amendment cases - POLITICO). The emergence of the new organization FIRE, which is financed by former ACLU activists, is a direct consequence of dissatisfaction with selectivity: FIRE has declared its mission to be “defending diversity of opinion” without regard to ideology, effectively challenging the ACLU (Free-speech group will spend millions to promote First Amendment cases - POLITICO) (Free-speech group will spend millions to promote First Amendment cases - POLITICO). Thus, the ACLU example shows how a change in priorities within a human rights organization can lead to an institutional split and the emergence of alternative projects aimed at returning to an equal approach for all groups.
• Local human rights groups in post-Soviet countries. In Russia, human rights organizations (Memorial, the Moscow Helsinki Group until 2022, OVD-Info, etc.) also did not adhere to the principle of protecting all those unjustly persecuted. Their criteria often excluded the protection of conservative political prisoners and openly xenophobic or violent associations. For example, when compiling a list of political prisoners, the Memorial Center openly stated that it did not include persons who had committed hate crimes or called for war. This led to the fact that ultra-nationalists, even if they were subjected to dubious persecution, were not recognized as political prisoners - unlike, say, Islamists convicted only for possessing literature. Such a policy is understandable from the point of view of political principles, but it is a violation of the right of any person to equal access to human rights protection. Nevertheless, the human rights group of the Russian human rights activist Andrey Babushkin, the Committee for Civil Rights, despite its commitment to liberal principles, did not refuse to protect the rights of conservative or far-right political prisoners, which speaks to the importance of the personal principles and convictions of a particular human rights activist or human rights organization. In Ukraine, human rights centers (for example, the Kharkiv Human Rights Group) defended both left-wing and right-wing activists in court in the 1990s and 2000s, but after 2014 they focused mainly on the topic of human rights in the context of armed conflict and the protection of pro-European reforms, practically excluding the human rights of pro-Russian political prisoners, who nevertheless are subject to significant political persecution and repression in Ukraine. In Belarus, there were essentially no independent human rights defenders at all, and after the repressions of 2020-2021, which started against the backdrop of an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Lukashenko regime by the efforts of the Western-backed opposition, independent human rights protection ceased to exist as a phenomenon. However, Belarusian human rights organizations were previously criticized by the authorities and society for “working for the opposition,” which in fact shows that human rights organizations in Belarus were involved not in human rights protection, but in the political struggle, using human rights protection only for their own political interests.